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FAA - Geographic Competition - Party in Interest
In August 1964 World Airways (World) and Nationwide Charters
and Conventions (Nationwide) negotiated a contract in which Nation-
wide agreed to solicit groups to charter World's planes to Florida and
Hawaii. Northeast Airlines (Northeast), which was losing revenue because
of competition from defendants' Florida flights, brought suit in federal
district court against Nationwide and World seeking injunctive relief.
The complaint stated that defendants had violated a section of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act which prohibits common carriage when done without
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) approval or when outside the scope of
a certificate issued by the CAB. A permanent injunction was granted to
Northeast, and Nationwide appealed alleging Northeast was not a "party
in interest" within the meaning of the statutory provision and therefore
not able to bring an action. Held, on remand, permanent injunction
granted: Northeast is a "party in interest" with sufficient grounds for
bringing suit, since it has shown that it will suffer a special injury if de-
fendant is allowed to continue its unauthorized activity, i.e., "competition
of a demonstrably direct sort." Northeast Airlines v. Nationwide Charters
and Conventions, 286 F. Supp. 362 (D.C. Mass. 1968).
Although the CAB normally enforces the provisions of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 (FAA), in certain instances a private party may
institute an action for enforcement in an appropriate federal court. Such
action is limited to alleging violation of section 401 (a) of the FAA.1
Section 401 (a) provides:
No carrier shall engage in any air transportation unless there is in force a
certificate issued by the Board authorizing such air carrier to engage in such
transportation.
The immediate controversy, however, does not stem from section 401 (a)
but from the section relating to "party in interest," section 1007 of the
FAA.' A private party must first be a "party in interest" before it can
allege a violation of the Act. Section 1007 states:
If any person violates any provision of this chapter, or any . . . limitation
of any certificate or permit issued under this chapter, the board or Adminis-
trator . . . or, in the case of a violation of sec. 401 (a) of this title any party
in interest, may apply to the district court of the United States . . . for the
enforcement of such ... condition or limitation ... [Emphasis added.].
It follows from tbese two sections that the CAB must approve any com-
mon carrier before it may legally engage in common carriage. Further-
more, the CAB may impose limitations in the certificate of approval on
172 Stat. 754 (1958), as amended, 76 Stat. 143, 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (a) (1964).
72 Stat. 796, 49 U.S.C. S 1487 (1964).
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when and where the carrier may conduct carriage. If CAB approval is not
received or if a carrier violates the limitations of that approval, then a
"party in interest" as well as the CAB may seek relief from the violation
in federal district court.
Litigation on what constitutes a "party in interest" centers on whether
a party is certified and on whether certain elements of competition and
damage are present. The first case decided on the "party in interest"
question was Flying Tiger Line v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.' Flying Tiger
brought suit to enjoin Santa Fe's operation of a subsidiary, Santa Fe Sky-
way. The two airlines were in direct competition along part of their routes.
Skyway was operating without CAB approval and the competition had
resulted in the loss of thirty customers of Flying Tiger, which possessed
only a letter of registration. The court stated that it was not necessary for
a plaintiff to be a certified carrier, that a carrier operating under a
letter of registration satisfied the test of a "party in interest." The court
based its decision strictly on the basis of competition stating:
[The decision will turn on] whether or not a party has a clear legal right
which will be directly affected . . .or whether or not the parties stand in a
competitive relationship to one another so that the threatened acts of a de-
fendant will directly and seriously affect a plaintiff by changing the trans-
portation situation [Emphasis added.].
Flying Tiger, because it possessed a letter of registration, had a legal
right which would be affected.
In 1948, however, the courts decided that at least a letter of regis-
tration was necessary. In Trans-Pacific Airlines v. Inter-Island Steam
Navigation Co.,' injunctive relief was denied to Trans-Pacific which was
engaged in irregular air carriage (no definite schedule). Trans-Pacific,
which was competing with Inter-Island on cargo flights to Hawaii, had
never received approval from the CAB for its flights. The court, after
considering the legislative history and workings of the Civil Aeronautics
Act, held that it should be given the same wide scope judicially accorded
the Transportation Act with reference to "party in interest." The court
set out these tests:
(1) Some definite legal right possessed by complaint is seriously threatened
and
(2) . . .the unauthorized and therefore illegal action of the defendant car-
rier directly and adversely affects the complaint's welfare by bringing about
some material change in the transportation situation.'
The first test must be satisfied by the plaintiff before the second can be
considered. Since Trans-Pacific was not approved by the CAB, it had no
legal right to engage exclusively in air freight flights and thus was not
protected against competition.
Another 1948 case dealt with a defendant who possessed CAB approval
3 75 F. Supp. 188 (S.D. Cal. 1947).4 Id. at 193.
5 75 F. Supp. 690 (D. Hawaii 1948).
Id. at 694.
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for its flights. In American Airlines v. Standard Airlines,' Standard, an
irregular air carrier, was alleged to be operating regularly scheduled
flights between coasts in competition with American. Such flights would
have placed Standard in the position of operating beyond the scope of its
certificate. Standard answered by challenging American's "party in inter-
est" status since Standard had approval for the route flown. The court de-
cided that American was a "party in interest" in view of the direct compe-
tition and the allegation of operation outside the scope of authority, both
of these factors bringing a case within the purview of section 401 (a).
The cause of action was sustained, but upon trial on the merits American
failed to show Standard was operating scheduled flights and holding out
to the public that it was doing so.
In a similar case involving two carriers with permits to fly within the
Territory of Alaska,' Pacific Northern Airlines sought an injunction to
prevent Alaska Airlines (Alaska Air) from operating flights from Alaska
to Canada and to the United States. Alaska Air questioned Pacific's "party
in interest" status by claiming the flights in question were charter flights
and not regularly scheduled. Pacific and two intervenors, Pan American
and Northwest, proved Alaska Air was holding itself out to the public as
operating regularly scheduled flights and received an injunction preventing
further violations of Alaska's certificate. The court based the relief on
the aspect of competition stating:
The proof is abundant to sustain their claim that they have been and are
being competitively damaged by the defendant's operations. If these opera-
tions were and are unlawful, the plaintiff . . . [is] entitled to relief.'
These two cases broadened the scope of judicial determination of a
"party in interest" by permitting suits against a certificated carrier violat-
ing a condition of its certificate. The acts complained of were actual and
not just threatened; thus, a court had not yet actually decided an aviation
case on the basis of threatened acts alone.
Case law to this point had interpreted a "party in interest" to include
those who had a clear legal right which was threatened by the acts of a
defendant which was engaged in direct competition (on a point to point
basis) with plaintiff without CAB approval or in violation of one of the
conditions of the certificate issued by the CAB. No further decisions were
rendered with respect to who was a "part in interest" under the Civil
Aeronautics Act (which was reenacted as the Federal Aviation Act of
1958).
In 1964 the instant case was instituted." World Airlines had entered
into an agreement with Nationwide pursuant to which the latter was to
charter a fixed number of planes for flights to Florida and Hawaii. World's
certificate allowed charter flights only when engaged "by a person for
his own use or for a group of persons (by a person no part of whose busi-
780 F. Supp. 592 (D. Alas. 1948).
1 Id.
Iid. at 607.
"Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. World Airways, Inc., 237 F. Supp. 383 (D. Mass. 1964).
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ness is the formation of groups ... or the solicitation or sale of transporta-
tion services)."" Nationwide, whose business was selling transportation
services, was soliciting the public for charter service to Florida and Hawaii
by attempting to classify customers into various "fraternal, social, or sport-
ing groups with minimal entrance requirements."" Nationwide's actions
were found to constitute "the conducting of individually-ticketed trans-
portation under the guise of charter trips."' 3 On appeal, the injunction as to
the Florida flights was upheld, but since World and Nationwide had raised
the "party in interest" issue, the case was remanded for further proceed-
ings with respect to the flights to Hawaii on the specific issue of whether
Northeast could be considered a "party in interest." The issue was: What
level of competition is necessary to bring Northeast into the status of a
"party in interest?"
The court of appeals had stated that "party in interest" required com-
petition of a demonstrably direct sort.'4 However, direct competition in
and of itself is not enough. There must also be a special injury to plain-
tiff. But the CAB has primary authority to regulate competition; thus
"party in interest" is a supplemental provision to the CAB's authority and
"does not make the injured party a public policeman.'"" The court's
qualification of direct competition might be viewed as new to this aspect
of the law; however, when viewed in context it is not. Special injury is
automatically a part of competition when a point to point basis is in-
volved. In Northeast competition with respect to the Hawaii flights
was not on a point to point basis and thus it was necessary to couple
"competition of a demonstrably direct sort" with a "special injury" to
plaintiff. Plaintiff had to show that his injury was not of the type that
would be suffered by everyone in the transportation field because some-
one had offered another trip to the public.
In tailoring its decision to this set of facts, the district court looked
outside the field of aviation law and discussed the tests for competition
used in two types of antitrust cases. Competition in this area involves the
"relevant market" test: Are the two goods or services in question part of
the same relevant or similar market? This requires an investigation into
the cross elasticity of services, that is, whether some change (usually the
price) in one leads to an increased or decreased demand for the other or
as stated in United States v. E. I. DuPont de Neinours and Co.:
The market . . .is composed of products that have a reasonable interchange-
ability for the purposes for which they are produced-price, use, and quali-
ties considered."
1 Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. World Airways, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 528, 530 (D. Mass. 1965).
12237 F. Supp. at 384.
13239 F. Supp. at 550.
14World Airways, Inc. v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 358 F.2d 691, 692 (1st Cir. 1966).
Is Id. at 692.
Is United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); Esso Standard' Oil Co.
v. Secatore's, Inc., 246 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1957).
" 351 U.S. at 404.
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In expanding the above test Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Secatore's, Inc."
stated that qualitatively different services may nevertheless be in the
same relevant market because of price differentials. In this case Esso was
giving "more service for a higher price" and consequently Secatore's was
giving "less service for a lower price." The Northeast court synthesized
its own test from the above as:
[T]he determination whether admittedly different services compete with
each other cannot be made by considering abstractly whether they are in
the same market; rather, the court must look to the interchangeability of the
two services. And this interchangeability can be determined principally by
looking to the impact which one service has, or is likely to have on the
other."
Although the wording is different, this statement basically reiterates that
there must be a threatened act which will cause special injury to the
plaintiff. The major change in the law is that now the unlawful threatened
acts do not have to be in the same geographical area. Interchangeability of
services is not in issue when competition is on a point to point basis be-
cause interchangeability is presumed if the services are identical. But if
the services are not in the same geographical area, then some element other
than geography must make them interchangeable. Although the court
did not use the phrase "threatened acts of defendant" which would cause
competition, this element may be interpreted from the court's phrase
[the] impact [that defendant's action] is likely to have on the
[plaintiff]."" Furthermore, "party in interest" requires not only competi-
tion but competition of a "demonstrably direct sort." Stated another way,
plaintiff must prove that defendant's illegal activities would be the proxi-
mate cause of his injury. This does not mean that direct competition be-
tween airlines is to be eliminated but only eliminated where the defendant
is acting illegally.
Finally, there must be a "special injury" to the plaintiff. The court
of appeals quoted from Western Pacific Railway v. Southern Pacific Co."
which held special injury was satisfied if "some definite legal right . . .
is seriously threatened or that the unauthorized . . . action of defendant
carrier may directly and adversely affect the [plaintiff's] welfare by
bringing about some material change in the transportation situation.""2
This is virtually what the court said in the Trans-Pacific Airlines case
decided twenty years earlier, and this is the test the district court used
in Northeast.
In applying the "interchangeability" and "special injury" criteria to
the facts, the district court concluded that since Hawaii and Florida were
warm weather vacation areas, there was direct competition between North-
east and Nationwide, taking into consideration the price differential which
8246 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 197).
Id. at 20.
"' Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. Nationwide Charters & Conventions, 286 F. Supp. 366 (D. Mass.
1968).
21284 U.S. 47 (1931).
'2 Id. at 51.
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made these "essentially dissimilar" services competitive. In view of Na-
tionwide's plan to expand its services, plaintiff would likely suffer an
economic injury of "serious and material" proportions thus satisfying the
concept of special injury.
This decision is consistent with others decided on the "party in interest"
question. Defendant was engaged in an illegal activity under section
401 (a) of the FAA; and if the plaintiff suffered a "special injury," it
was a "party in interest." The expansion of earlier decisions rests solely
on now allowing a plaintiff to seek enjoinment of activity not directly
competitive on a point to point basis. Thus "interchangeability of services"
has now been expressly stated whereas, prior to Northeast, it was implicit
in the case, since competition was on a point to point basis. Looking to
substance and not form, the court in effect said that if a defendant is
engaged in illegal carriage, plaintiff may seek an injunction if he proves
his service is interchangeable and directly competitive, whether or not
they are in the same geographic area. In deciding whether or not services
are interchangeable, cross elasticity is a good indicator, although the court
here rejects it in form. In substance, however, if two goods or services
are interchangeable, they have a high degree of cross elasticity. Florida
and Hawaii have separate demand curves and in that sense represent differ-
ent markets. But they are interchangeable for the purpose of vacations
away from the inclement winter weather of the Northeast. To illustrate
this point the cross elasticity of beef and pork will suffice. Each has its
own demand curve, but the two are interchangeable from the standpoint
of satisfying the meat portion of a consumer's diet. A change in the price
of one will lead to a change in demand for the other, thus making their
cross elasticity high. Applying this to the facts of this case, Nationwide's
reduction of the cost of a vacation in Hawaii reduced the demand for
Florida vacations. Since these two services have a high degree of elasticity,
the illegal transaction of business by Nationwide, while not directly affect-
ing Northeast, had such a substantial indirect effect as to make Northeast
a proper "party in interest."
R. Michael Parker
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